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Article 9

Their Own Prepossessions'
The Establishment Clause, 1999-2000
Leslie C. Griffin*

I. INTRODUCTION

In 1999, the Supreme Court held out the promise of settling the
disarray in First Amendment Establishment Clause jurisprudence when
it accepted two cases about the role of religion in public and private
schools. From Everson2 to Agostini,3 the opinions in this area of the
law have lacked a clear or consistent rationale. In the 1999-2000 term,
in Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, the Court ruled that a
public school district's policy permitting student-led, student-initiated
prayer at football games violates the Establishment Clause.4 The Court
found no Establishment Clause violation, however, in Mitchell v.
Helms, for a federal school aid program under which educational
5
materials and equipment were loaned to private religious schools.
Mitchell suggested a new Establishment Clause jurisprudence when the
Court overruled two earlier cases, Meek 6 and Wolman.

1. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 238 (1948) (Jackson, J.,
concurring). There is not "one word [in the Constitution] to help us as judges to decide where the
secular ends and the sectarian begins in education. Nor can we find guidance in any other legal
source. It is a matter on which we can find no law but our own prepossessions." Id. at 237-38
(Jackson, J., concurring).
* Associate Professor, Santa Clara University School of Law. Ph.D., Yale (Religious
Studies); J.D., Stanford Law School. Thanks to Bob Drinan, Joan Krause, Brad Joondeph,
Margaret Russell, June Carbone, Mark Tushnet and Margalynne Armstrong for their suggestions
about the argument, and to Nadine Matta and Gretchen Dunbar for excellent and prompt research
assistance.
2. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
3. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
4. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 316 (2000). For analysis of Santa Fe, see
The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, 114 HARV. L. REV. 179, 249-56 (2000) [hereinafter
Leading Cases].
5. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 835 (2000) (plurality opinion). For an analysis of
Mitchell, see Leading Cases, supra note 4, at 239-48.
6. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), overruled by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793
(2000).
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Santa Fe and Mitchell demonstrate that the promise of a settled
Establishment Clause jurisprudence remains unfulfilled, and that
forthcoming decisions (about, e.g., vouchers and other forms of school
aid and activity) 8 may be even more disputed.
Three justices
(Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas) voted for both aid and prayer 9 while
three justices (Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg) voted against both aid and
prayer.' ° Three swing voters (O'Connor, Kennedy and Breyer)
determined the outcome of the two cases: against prayer and for aid. I I
(Of course, no justice voted for prayer and against private school aid.)
Only a plurality (Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas) agreed with
the rationale for private school funding in Mitchell.12 Justices
O'Connor and Breyer agreed with the result of lending aid to private
religious schools, but thought that the plurality's reasoning was too
sweeping. 13
The opinions themselves, moreover, confirm the intensity of disputes
about religion and call into question the Court's ability to resolve them.
The justices do not even agree whether an invocation before a football
game is religious or secular. 14 Justice Thomas complains of antiCatholic bigotry. 15 Justice Rehnquist accuses the Santa Fe majority of
hostility to religion; he says that Justice Stevens' opinion "bristles with
hostility to all things religious in public life."' 16 Justice Souter disputes
Thomas' charges of bigotry while acknowledging the "antagonism of
controversy over public support for religious causes." 17 Finally,
although endorsement and neutrality appear to dominate the
constitutional analysis, the opinions rely upon a hodgepodge of tests,
including Souter's neutrality and Thomas' neutrality and private choice,
O'Connor's actual diversion and Souter's divertibility, Stevens'

7. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977), overruled by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793
(2000). For a review of the two new cases, see Akhil R. Amar, Foreword: The Document and the
Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26 (2000) and Erwin Chemerinsky, Divided Court Grapples with
Religion, 36 TRIAL 86 (2000).
8. See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 202 F.3d 502 (2d Cir. 2000), rev'd, 121
S. Ct. 2093 (2001).
9. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 835 (plurality opinion); Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 323 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting).
10. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 910 (Souter, J., dissenting); Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 317.
11. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 835 (plurality opinion); Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 317.
12. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 801 (plurality opinion).
13. Id. at 837 (plurality opinion).
14. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 309, 324.
15. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 828 (plurality opinion).
16. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 318 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
17. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 868 (Souter, J., dissenting).

2001]

Their Own Prepossessions

government coercion and Thomas' diluted government endorsement.
Justice Rehnquist expands the "secular purpose" test 1 8 while Justice
Thomas announces the demise of the "pervasively sectarian" standard. 19
Since 1947, the Court has employed different versions of these varied
tests in the Establishment Clause cases about private and public schools.
The array of tests explains the widespread sentiment that Establishment
Clause jurisprudence is muddled, even incoherent. 20 The two new
cases, with their overruling of Meek and Wolman, have not added clarity
to the case law, however. Indeed, new problems await us.
In the Establishment Clause cases set in schools, the litany of
confusion is by now well known: 21 that the Court permitted government
funding of bus rides to private schools 22 but not field trips from private
schools; 23 of books 24 but not maps, globes and projectors; 25 of
standardized testing in private schools but not tests written by private
school officials; 26 of religious universities 27 but not religious elementary
and secondary schools. 28 The case law allowed released time religious
instruction on private school but not public school grounds 29 and
accepted the presumption that public school teachers do not retain their
secular perspective once they enter religious schools. 30 The Court
prohibited the funding of secular subjects in religious schools 3 1 while

18. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 322 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
19. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 829 (plurality opinion).
20. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 110 (1985) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("The results
from our school services cases show the difficulty we have encountered in making the Lemon test
yield principled results."); Leading Cases, supra note 4, at 253 ("[A]n area of jurisprudence
currently perceived as contradictory and unprincipled."); Michael W. McConnell, Religious
Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 117-20 (1992) ("It is a mess.").
21. See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 110-11 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
22. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17 (1947).
23. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 255 (1977), overruled by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S.
793 (2000).
24. Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
25. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), overruled by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793
(2000).
26. Comm. for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 661 (1980); Wolman, 433 U.S. at 240;
Meek, 421 U.S. at 372; Levitt v. Comm. for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472, 480 (1973).
27. Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 767 (1976); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734,
749 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 689 (1971).
28. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971).
29. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 311 (1952); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ.,
333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948).
30. Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 385 (1985), overruled by Agostini v.
Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 409 (1985), overruled by Agostini
v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
31. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 620.
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upholding the constitutionality of religious worship on public school
32
grounds.
In this essay, I employ an analytical framework that the Court has not
adopted in order to criticize and clarify Establishment Clause
jurisprudence on aid to religion. Although it has deployed numerous
tests about neutrality and endorsement, since 1947 the Court has in
effect employed first an institutional and then a speaker analysis in
order to determine when government support of religious education is
constitutional.33 Neither standard has proven adequate to protect core
First Amendment values. I argue that the Court should use a subject
standard that distinguishes between religious practice and public
welfare. Government support of religious practice is unconstitutional;
government provision of public welfare benefits to all citizens is
constitutional.
From 1947 to 1997 the test for what was unconstitutional and
constitutional in the schools was in effect an institutional spectrum. At
the unconstitutional end of the line was the "church school, 34 at the
constitutional end the public school. Unable (or unwilling) to recognize
that some education at religious schools is secular and that some
religious activity occurs at public schools, the Court (with some limited,
inconsistent exceptions) prohibited aid to religious schools. Instead of
focusing on the type of activity, religious or secular, the decisions
depended on the identity of the school. Under an institutional standard,
the church school is completely religious and the public school is
completely secular. The government, for example, may pay for the bus
ride to religious school (the student is not yet in the building),35 but not
for the field trip that students take from the religious school.36 Public
school students may receive released-time religious instruction as long
38
as it takes place on religious 37 and not public school grounds.
The institutional line of analysis reached its apex in 1985, in Aguilar
v. Felton, when the Court ruled that it was unconstitutional for New
York to send public school teachers into religious schools because they
32. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981).
33. For further discussion of the development of the institutional principle, see Leslie Griffin,
"We Do Not Preach. We Teach. ": Religion Professorsand the FirstAmendment, 19 QUINNIPIAC
L. REV. 1 (2000).
34. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
35. Id. at 18.
36. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 254 (1977), overruled by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S.
793 (2000).
37. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 315 (1952).
38. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 209-10 (1948).
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might indoctrinate the students once they got there. 39 Something about
the religious school environment might infect even experienced public
school teachers. Eventually the Court decided that this principle was
too harsh, even hostile, toward religion, and it overruled Aguilar (in
Agostini v. Felton) in 1997. 40 The legacy of the institutional principle
may explain Justice Thomas' complaints in Mitchell about anti-Catholic
bigotry. (In Mitchell, as in the earlier cases, the "church schools" have
been predominantly Catholic. 4 1)
Long before Agostini, the Court had discovered another problem with
the institutional spectrum at the public school end. In the 1980s,
religious speakers complained that they were unfairly excluded from
public schools. Beginning in 1981, with Widmar v. Vincent, 42 the Court
decided a line of cases that prohibited the exclusion of religious worship
and religious speech from public school grounds. The institutional
spectrum-with its vision of a completely secular public school-was
not equipped to handle religion in public institutions. Accordingly, the
Court decided that private speech about or of religion is permitted on
public school grounds while government speech (especially government
endorsement or coercion of religion) is prohibited. The analysis turns
on who speaks (rather than where the conduct occurs) and on whether
that person's speech can reasonably be attributed to the government.
The irony of the speaker standard is that the Court permitted religious
practice in the public schools before it accepted secular conduct in the
43
religious schools.
This focus on the speaker has meant that religion cases now involve
Free Speech instead of Free Exercise claims. The Court has offered
broad protection to religious speech while neglecting Establishment
Clause considerations. 44 Under the speaker standard, the Court has

39. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 409 (1985), overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S.
203 (1997); see also Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 397 (1985), overruled by
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
40. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 209.
41. Mitchell v. Helms, 503 U.S. 793, 803 (2000) (plurality opinion); see also Aguilar, 473
U.S. at 406; Ball, 473 U.S. at 379; Wolman, 433 U.S. at 234; Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426
U.S. 736, 744 (1976); Comm. for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 768 (1973); Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615 (1971); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 676 (1971); Bd. of
Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 238 (1968); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 3 (1947).
42. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
43. Compare Widmar, 454 U.S. at 277 (holding that a university cannot exclude religious
groups from meeting on university property), with Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234-35 (1997) (holding
that a federally funded program for a religious school is constitutional).
44. See Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. 384, 394 (1993); Bd.
of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 253 (1990); Widmar, 454 U.S. at
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mischaracterized religious worship as speech and then accorded this
"speech" protection that the Establishment Clause prohibits. The apex
(until recently) of the speaker standard is the Court's 1995 decision in
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of Virginia, in which the
Court ordered the University of Virginia to fund an evangelical student
newspaper whose purpose was the conversion of its readers to
Christianity.4 5 The rationale for the majority's decision was that
religion is a viewpoint, not a subject.46 Rosenberger implied that there
is no subject matter of religion and no distinction between religious and
secular. Without a distinction between religious and secular the religion
clauses are meaningless. Unlike Aguilar and the institutional principle,
Rosenberger and the speaker standard remain good law. Indeed, the
new decision in Santa Fe is based on the speaker test.
Although the subject standard (by which public prayer is religious
practice barred by the Establishment Clause) is implicit in the majority
opinion in Santa Fe, the speaker analysis predominates. 47 Students
announce invocations over the loud speaker system before football
games. To whom should their speech be attributed: the school district
or the students? This question is the key dispute between majority and
dissent. The majority emphasizes the government facilities, including
the sound system and the team uniforms. 48 The dissent insists that the
case is about the private choices of students, as determined through
student elections. 49 This disagreement should remind us that the
speaker distinction provides little protection against public religious
practice. 50 If the students use private microphones, for example, the
277; Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 202 F.3d 502 (2d Cir. 2000), rev'd, 121 S. Ct. 2093
(2001).
45. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 843-44 (1995). The
victory for the students in the Good News case is a new apex. Good News Club, 202 F.3d 502,
rev'd, 121 S. Ct. 2093 (2001).
46. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831. "Religion may be a vast area of inquiry, but it also
provides, as it did here, a specific premise, a perspective, a standpoint from which a variety of
subjects may be discussed and considered." Id.
47. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 315 (2000).
48. Id. at 307-08.
49. Id. at 320-21 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
50. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 644-45 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Given the odd basis for the Court's decision, invocations and benedictions will be able
to be given at public school graduations next June, as they have for the past century
and a half, so long as school authorities make clear that anyone who abstains from
screaming in protest does not necessarily participate in the prayers. All that is
seemingly needed is an announcement, or perhaps a written insertion at the beginning
of the graduation program, to the effect that, while all are asked to rise for the
invocation and benediction, none is compelled to join in them, nor will be assumed, by
rising, to have done so. That obvious fact recited, the graduates and their parents may
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prayer will appear more private to the Court although no different to the
audience. Post-Santa Fe, it will not be difficult for a majority who
wants public prayer in the schools to avoid any constitutional
restrictions.
Mitchell's result is consistent with the subject test. The aid-books,
computers, projectors-should be assessed by how analogous it is to
public welfare or religious practice. Justices O'Connor and Breyer
provided two potential votes for a subject standard in Mitchell. The
plurality, however, introduced an evenhandedness neutrality test that
permits direct government aid to religious practice. The plurality's
constitutional standard permits direct government aid to institutions that
are pervasively sectarian, i.e., not secular. Not only has Justice Thomas
ignored the irony that on behalf of the Catholic Church he permits
funding for pervasively sectarian schools. 5 1 The plurality also missed
the legal point. The Establishment Clause permits the government to
fund secular subjects but prohibits assistance to religious activity.
Again, without a distinction between religious and secular the religion
clauses are meaningless.
The results of these two new cases-no prayer in public schools,
some secular aid for private schools-are probably correct, 52 but they
are based on faulty reasoning. The results depend upon the justices'
case-by-case analysis of the facts. Although facts always decide cases,
the facts are unrelated to any standard that understands religious
practice. The prayer case depends on how much school equipment and
how many school teachers support the prayer. The aid case depends on
what number of religious books is enough to constitute a constitutional
violation.
Combined with the Court's sweeping decision in
Rosenberger,Mitchell threatens an Establishment Clause without limits.
In an early schools case, the 1948 decision in McCollum v. Board of
Education, the Court ruled that it was unconstitutional for Illinois to
proceed to thank God, as Americans have always done, for the blessings He has
generously bestowed on them and on their country.
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also David Firestone, South's Football Fans Still Stand Up and
Pray, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2000, at Al ("Handbills had been distributed by a Christian ministry
active in southern Mississippi urging people to pray just before the game, but no loudspeaker was
used, and there was no official leader.").
51.

See generally 2 ERNST TROELTSCH,

THE SOCIAL TEACHING OF THE CHRISTIAN

CHURCHES 993, 1007 (Olive Wyon trans., The MacMillan Co. 4th ed. 1956) (1911) (contrasting
church with sect). "Roman Catholicism is the pure and logical form of the Church-type.... The
sect is a voluntary society, composed of ... believers [who] ... live apart from the world, are
limited to small groups, emphasize the law instead of grace." 2 id.
52. I say "probably correct" instead of "correct" because of the different readings of the facts
of Mitchell.
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permit released time religious instruction on public school grounds. 53
Justice Jackson concurred, but warned that there is not "one word [in
the Constitution] to help us as judges to decide where the secular ends
and the sectarian begins in education. Nor can we find guidance in any
other legal source. It is a matter on which we can find no law but our
own prepossessions." 54 In 2001, the law of the schools is a law of their
own prepossessions, precisely because the Court has ignored the
distinction between the secular and the sectarian. Once again the Court
has opted for confusion and inconsistency in Establishment Clause
jurisprudence in service of their own prepossessions about religion.
The Court should employ a subject spectrum-with religious practice
at one end and public welfare at the other. The government may (or
must) provide public welfare benefits to all its citizens, but it must not
aid religious practice. Under the subject standard, Santa Fe is a case
"about prayer," 55 i.e., about religious worship, not speech. Santa Fe
should be the easy case under the First Amendment, not because of who
speaks but due to the nature of the activity. Prayer is a quintessential
religious practice. It is the benchmark for assessing constitutional
violations under the core Establishment Clause principle: no-aid-toreligious-practice. Aid includes any use of public facilities.
In contrast, public welfare may be given to religious schools. Public
welfare consists of neutral, secular benefits-such as police and fire
protection-to which all citizens are entitled.56 The aid in Mitchell
should be assessed by its similarity and difference to prayer and public
welfare. Most of the books were secular. Public welfare aid must not
be diverted to religious practice. For that reason, the use of the
projectors for theology classes was unconstitutional. When public
welfare aid is divertible, the government must closely monitor the aid to
ensure that diversion to religious practice does not occur.57 The quality
58
of the monitoring in Jefferson Parish was uncertain.
A subject-matter standard that bars religious practices from public
schools and public funding is adequate to protect the religious schools
and to correct prior Establishment Clause excesses. It avoids hostility
to religion by acknowledging that many activities in religious schools
are not religious practices. It also recognizes Establishment Clause

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948).
Id. at 237-38 (Jackson, J., concurring).
Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 315 (2000).
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 831-32 (2000) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 832 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 832-33 & n.15 (plurality opinion).
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limits on public religion that are unacceptable to Mitchell's plurality.
Finally, the subject-matter test explains why no justice voted for school
prayer and against school aid. An Establishment Clause that permits
public religious practices-especially prayer-is an Establishment
Clause that sets few (if any) limits on government sponsorship of
religion.
I turn now to a more detailed analysis of the Court's most recent
Establishment Clause cases: Santa Fe (in Part II) and Mitchell (in Part
III). I return to the Establishment Clause considerations that support the
subject standard in my Conclusion.
II. SANTA FE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT V. DOE

The Santa Fe Independent School District, in southern Texas,
adopted numerous policies regarding prayer at public school
functions. 59 Before 1995 an elected student chaplain prayed over the
After a First
public address system before football games. 6°
Amendment challenge to that practice by students and their parents, in
1995 the school district adopted a series of guidelines that permitted
student prayer. 6 1 The May and July 1995 policies dealt with prayer at
football;
graduation. 62 The August and October 1995 policies covered 63
standards.
graduation
the
of
provisions
the
on
modeled
were
they
Although the May policy included a limitation that the graduation
prayer must be "nonsectarian, nonproselytizing invocations and
benedictions," 64 the July and August policies omitted the nonsectarian,
nonproselytizing requirement. 65 The July and August standards,
however, did include these limitations as fallback provisions that would
apply only if the district court enjoined the "preferred policy," which
was the policy without the nonsectarian, nonproselytizing
66
requirement.
The school district's August policy, entitled "Prayer at Football
Games," called for two elections. 67 First, students vote whether to have

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Santa Fe, 530 U.S. 295-300 & n.6.
Id. at 294.
Id.
Id. at 296.
Id. at 296-99 & n.6.
Id. at 296 (citing Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 806, 811 (5th Cir. 1999)).
Id. at 297-98.
Id. at 298.
Id. at 297.

246
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an invocation. 68 If the students voted for an invocation, in a second
election they chose the student speaker. 69 In August 1995, under this
70
policy, students voted for prayer before football games.
The final October policy had some revisions. 7 1 Its title was "Student
Activities: Pre-Game Ceremonies at Football Games." 72 It mentioned
"messages" and "invocations," not prayers.7 3 The "nonsectarian" and
"nonproselytizing" requirement was omitted, except as a fallback
provision. 74 "Prayer" is not included in the text of the October policy,
which stated that:
[t]he board has chosen to permit students to deliver a brief invocation
and/or message to be delivered during the pre-game ceremonies of
home varsity football games to solemnize the event, to promote good
sportsmanship and student safety,
and to establish the appropriate
75
environment for the competition.
The October policy maintained the two-stage election. 76 A new
election was not conducted in October 1995, however; the pro-prayer
results of the August election stood unchanged.7 7
The district court enjoined the preferred policy as a violation of the
Establishment Clause under Lee v. Weisman,78 but upheld the
alternative fallback provisions under Jones v. Clear Creek Independent
School District.79 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit then reversed the district
court on the fallback provisions, ruling that Clear Creek, which
permitted nonsectarian and nonproselytizing prayers at high school
80
graduation ceremonies, does not apply to football games.
Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit ruled that both the preferred and the
fallback policies for prayer at football games were unconstitutional.8 1

68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 297-98.
71. Id. at 298.
72. Id. at 298 n.6.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 298 & n.6.
76. Id. at 298 n.6.
77. Id. at 298 n.5.
78. Id. at 299; Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
79. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 299; Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir.
1992).
80. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 300 (citing Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 806, 823
(5th Cir. 1999)).
81. Id. at 299.
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question "whether the
policy permitting student-led, student-initiated prayer at football games
violates the Establishment Clause." 82 The Court concluded that the
October policy was unconstitutional 83 over a dissent that the Court's
ruling was premature. 84 The dissent argued that the Court should await
the October policy's implementation to see if there was a constitutional
violation, particularly to see if students actually voted to have speakers
or if students were elected, not to pray, but due to "public speaking
85
ability or social popularity."
It is conceivable that the election could become one in which student
candidates campaign on platforms that focus on whether or not they
will pray if elected. It is also conceivable that the election could lead
to a Christian prayer before 90 percent of the football games. If, upon
implementation, the policy operated in this fashion, we would have a
record before us to review whether the policy, as applied, violated the
Establishment Clause or unduly suppressed minority viewpoints. But
it is possible that the students might vote not to have a pregame
which case there would be no threat of a constitutional
speaker, in
86
violation.
According to the dissent, the majority's act of deciding the case before
the policy was implemented displayed the majority's "hostility to all
87
things religious in public life."
The majority and the dissent disagreed about the timing of the facial
challenge to an October policy that had not been implemented. In terms
of Establishment Clause analysis, they disputed the application of the
government coercion/endorsement test and the secular purpose test.
The Court relied on the speaker standard. First Amendment case law
distinguishes "government speech endorsing religion, which the
Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion,
which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect." 88 The
majority concluded that the school district policy was unconstitutional
because the government endorsed the religious practice of prayer and

82. Id. at 301.
83. Id. at 314.
84. Id. at 326 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 321 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
86. Id. (Rehnquist, C., dissenting)
87. Id. at 318 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 302 (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250
(1990)).
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coerced participation in it. 89 The dissent argued that the case involved
90
the private speech of students.
In order to support his argument that this case was about government
speech, Justice Stevens emphasized the facts that illustrated the school
district's involvement. 9 1 The school district implemented the policies.92
The invocations were given over the school's public address system, on
government property, at games sponsored by the school, before games
in which the teams wore school uniforms. 9 3 Santa Fe did not create a
public forum in which individual students spoke. 94 There was no
forum, with a range of student opinions; only one student was chosen
95
for the entire football season to speak on a confined topic.
The same facts supported a conclusion of government endorsement
of prayer and government coercion of religious practice. The school
was involved in the selection of the religious speaker through school
policies and elections. "[T]he policy, by its terms, invites and
encourages religious messages." 96 The invocation language did not
negate the endorsement of religion; by definition, invocation "describes
an appeal for divine assistance." 97 Moreover, by using government
facilities at a school function, the policy "coerces student participation
in religious events." 98 The majority rejected the school district's two
contentions about coercion: first, there is no coercion because the
prayers arise from student choices; and second, attendance at football
games is voluntary and so attendees cannot be coerced. 99
The first claim merely reiterate the district's private speech argument
(rejected by the majority, but persuasive to the dissent) that the student,
a private speaker, is a "circuit-breaker ' 1°° who distances the prayer
from the government. As for voluntary attendance at football games,
"[t]o assert that high school students do not feel immense social

89. Id. at 312.
90. Id. at 324 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 305-08.
92. Id. at 306.
93. Id. at 307-08.
94. Id. at 304.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 306.
97. Id. at 306-07.
98. Id. at 299 (quoting Petitioner's Appendix of Petition for Certiorari).
99. Id. at 310.
100. Id. at 305; see also John P. Cronan, Comment, A Political Process Argument for the
Constitutionalityof Student-Led, Student-InitiatedPrayer, 18 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 503 (2000)
(defending distinction between student-led, student-initiated prayer and government prayer).
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pressure, or have a truly genuine desire, to be involved in the
extracurricular event that is American high school football is
' 1°1
'formalistic in the extreme."
10 2
In the dissent, Justice Rehnquist interpreted the facts differently.
The policy permits students to vote, to select a speaker, to give the
invocation or not. 10 3 The students, not the government, decide whether
the invocation will be religious or secular. 1 4 The elections are not only
about prayer and religion: "It is also possible that the election would not
' 10 5
focus on prayer, but on public speaking ability or social popularity."
According to Justice Rehnquist, the haste of the majority to invalidate
the statute before there was a record of student elections confirmed its
hostility to religion. 106 The case is about students. Without government
endorsement of religion, Rehnquist concluded, there is no violation of
the First Amendment. 107
The majority and the dissent also disagreed about the policy's
purpose: "Under the Lemon standard, a court must invalidate a statute if
it lacks 'a secular legislative purpose." ' 10 8 For the majority, "this policy
is about prayer,"' 1 9 a particular religious practice that is not secular.
Although courts usually defer to the government's characterization of
its purpose, "it is nonetheless the duty of the courts to 'distinguis[h] a
sham secular purpose from a sincere one.""'1 0 For the majority, the text
and history of the policy supported the conclusion that it is about prayer
only." 1 Prayer does not have a secular purpose.
The dissent urged deference to the government, arguing that the
school policy has "plausible secular purposes: to solemnize the event, to
promote good sportsmanship and student safety, and to establish the
appropriate environment for competition."" 2 Moreover, the school
district made repeated efforts to comply with the First Amendment and

101. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 311 (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 595 (1992)).
102. Id. at 320-23 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 320-21 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 321 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
105. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 318 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 321 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 314 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971)).
109. Id. at 315.
110. Id. at 308 (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 75 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(alteration in original)).
111. Id. at315.
112. Id. at 322 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Petitioner's Appendix of Petition for
Certiorari).

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 33

the district court rulings."13 According to the dissent, the efforts to act
constitutionally, i.e., with a secular purpose, entitled the district to
deference by the Court. 114
III. MITCHELL V. HELMS

At issue in Mitchell was Chapter 2 of the Education Consolidation
and Improvement Act of 1981.115 Under the challenged provisions of
the statute, the federal government provided funds to state and local
government agencies, which then loaned educational materials and
116
equipment to local private and public primary and secondary schools.
The materials, which included library services, media materials,
computers and computer software, were distributed according to school
enrollment on a per capita basis. 117 The Act required that these
materials supplement, not supplant, the private school budgets from
non-federal sources."l 8 The law also required that the materials be
"secular, neutral and non-ideological." 119 Materials are loaned to
private schools, which may not acquire control of or take title to
120
them.
In Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, private schools received a variety of
materials under the provisions of the Act. 12 1 "Among the materials and
equipment provided have been library books, computers, and computer
software, and also slide and movie projectors, overhead projectors,
television sets, tape recorders, VCR's, projection screens, laboratory
122
equipment, maps, globes, filmstrips, slides and cassette recordings."'
In 1986-87, forty-six private schools in Jefferson Parish received aid:
thirty-four Roman Catholic schools, seven other religious schools and
123
five non-religious schools.
The litigation history of the case reflects the confusion of the
Establishment Clause cases. The lawsuit was first filed in 1985.124 In

113. Id. at 323-24 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
114. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
115. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 801 (2000) (plurality opinion); see also Innovative
Education Program Strategies, 20 U.S.C. §§ 7301 to 7373 (1994).
116. 20 U.S.C. §§ 7301 to 7373.
117. 20 U.S.C. § 7372(a)(1).
118. 20 U.S.C. § 7371(b).
119. 20 U.S.C. § 7372(a)(1).
120. 20 U.S.C. § 7372(c)(1).
121. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 803 (2000) (plurality opinion).
122. Id. (plurality opinion).
123. Id. (plurality opinion).
124. Id. (plurality opinion).
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1990, a district court concluded that Chapter 2 was unconstitutional
under Meek and Wolman. 125 In 1997, a second district court opinion
upheld Chapter 2 because of intervening case law, 126 including
Rosenberger and Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District,127 as
well as the Ninth Circuit's decision in Walker v. San Francisco Unified
School District.128 The Supreme Court then decided Agostini while an
appeal of the second district court order was pending in the Fifth
Circuit. 129

Faced with conflicting

precedents, the Fifth Circuit

invalidated Chapter 2 under Meek and Wolman. 130 The Supreme Court
finally upheld Chapter 2, overruling Meek and Wolman.
A. Endorsement/Neutrality
As in Santa Fe, the government endorsement test is central to the
Court's analysis. 13 1 There is unquestionably government conduct in
Mitchell-school funding. Thus the plurality opinion did not question
the application of this standard in the school funding context. 132 Stepby-step, however, it unlinked government funding from government
endorsement and weakened the test so that it retains little bite.
First, the plurality identified "indoctrination" as the specific practice
that the endorsement rule prohibits. 133 Then the indoctrination test
became one of attribution. "[T]he question whether governmental aid to
religious schools results in governmental indoctrination is ultimately a
question whether any religious indoctrination that occurs in those
schools could reasonably be attributed to governmental action."' 134 On
its face, the attribution test should be easy to meet, especially in a case
in which federal legislation explicitly provided labeled equipment to
private schools. Nonetheless, Justice Thomas concluded that this aid
cannot be attributed to the government for two reasons: private choice
and neutrality. 135 These steps, from endorsement to indoctrination to
125. Id. at 804 (plurality opinion) (citing Helms v. Cody, No. 85-5533, 1990 WL 36124 (E.D.
La. Mar. 27, 1990)).
126. Helms v. Cody, No. 85-5533, 1997 WL 35283, at *16 (E.D. La. Jan. 28, 1997), rev'd,
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
127. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Zobrest v.
Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
128. Walker v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 46 F.3d 1449 (9th Cir. 1995).
129. Mitchell, 530 U.S. 793 (plurality opinion); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
130. Helms v. Picard, 151 F.3d 347, 374 (5th Cir. 1998).
131. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 301-10 (2000).
132. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 807-14 (plurality opinion).
133. Id. at 809 (plurality opinion).
134. Id. (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
135. Id. at 809-14 (plurality opinion).
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attribution to private choice and neutrality, provide great latitude for the
government to provide aid to religion.
On private choice, the plurality concluded that Chapter 2 is
constitutional because the government money is spent according to the
private choices of the parents. 136 Although the materials go directly to
the schools, the per capita provision, which allots total aid based on the
number of students who attend each school, converts the program into
one of voluntary choice. If the aid is given to religious schools because
of the private choices of parents, there is no government endorsement of
'1 38
religion. 137 Private choice avoids the "imprimatur of state approval."
On neutrality, the plurality concluded that there is no indoctrination as
long as the aid is distributed neutrally "to a broad range of groups or
139
persons without regard to their religion."'
"If the religious, irreligious, and areligious are all alike eligible for
governmental aid, no one would conclude that any indoctrination that
any particular recipient conducts has been done at the behest of the
40
government." 1
Oddly enough, this neutrality permits religious indoctrination with
government aid. "If the government is offering assistance to recipients
who provide, so to speak, a broad range of indoctrination, the
government itself is not thought responsible for any particular
indoctrination."' 4' Such a broad neutrality standard deflects attention
from the content of the aid and the activity of the
recipient-considerations that form the core of the Establishment
Clause.
Justice O'Connor's concurrence proposed a stricter government
endorsement test than the plurality's. Justice O'Connor stated that the
government may not endorse religious practice. Accordingly, she
criticized the plurality's private choice and neutrality as inadequate

136. Id. (plurality opinion).
137. Id. at 810 (plurality opinion).
138. Id. at 813 (plurality opinion).
139. Id. at 809 (plurality opinion).
140. Id. (plurality opinion).
141. Id. at 809-10 (plurality opinion). But see Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 617 (1992)
(Souter, J., concurring). According to Justice Souter in Lee:
Nor does it solve the problem to say that the State should promote a "diversity" of
religious views; that position would necessarily compel the government and,
inevitably, the courts to make wholly inappropriate judgments about the number of
religions the State should sponsor and the relative frequency with which it should
sponsor each.
Id.(Souter, J., concurring).
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constitutional standards.' 42 Per capita funding conveys government
endorsement to the reasonable observer; "true private-choice" does
not. 143 Students have no control over their money under the per capita
standard.
That the amount of aid received by the school is based on the school's
enrollment does not separate the government from the endorsement of
the religious message. The aid formula does not-and could
not-indicate to a reasonable observer that the inculcation of religion
is endorsed only by the individuals attending the religious school, who
each affirmatively choose to direct the secular government aid to44the
school and its religious mission. No such choices have been made. 1
Moreover, Justice O'Connor complained that, as interpreted by the
plurality, neutrality is "a rule of unprecedented breadth" 14 5 which
"foreshadows the approval of direct monetary subsidies to religious
organizations ...[for] religious objectives." 146 Such neutrality violates
the Establishment Clause prohibition against public financing of
47
religious purposes. 1
O'Connor supported the majority result because, on the facts of
Mitchell, she concluded that the Jefferson Parish schools did not use the
educational materials to endorse or inculcate religion. Thus, while
refusing to join the Mitchell plurality in eviscerating the endorsement
test, she and Justice Breyer parted company with their Santa Fe
colleagues over a factual determination of whether government
endorsement occurred in Louisiana.
According to dissenting Justice Souter, "[tihe plurality would break
with the law.

The majority misapplies it."' 148 The law is no-aid-to-

religion. The misapplication is that the materials were diverted to
religious use. 149 For Justice Souter, no aid is a better test than
endorsement because the constitutional violation occurs when the aid is
given, not when it is noticed.' 50 He concluded that:
While perceived state endorsement of religion is undoubtedly a
relevant concern under the Establishment Clause, it is certainly not the
only one. Everson made this clear from the start: secret aid to religion

142. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 837-44 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
143. Id. at 842-43 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
144. Id. at 843 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
145. Id. at 837 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
146. Id. at 844 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
147. See id. at 837-40 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
148. Id. at 911 (Souter, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 910 (Souter, J., dissenting).
150. See id. at 900-01 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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by the government is also barred. State aid not attributed to the
government would still violate a taxpayer's liberty of conscience,
threaten to corrupt religion, and generate disputes over aid.15 '
The plurality's test is far too permissive for the dissent. 152 Justice
Thomas has taken one account of neutrality, evenhandedness neutrality,
and converted it to the sole test of constitutionality. 153 This position is
unrepresentative of the case law, which includes three accounts of
neutrality. 154 "'Neutrality' has been employed as a term to describe the
requisite state of government equipoise between the forbidden
encouragement and discouragement of religion; to characterize a benefit
1 55
or aid as secular; and to indicate evenhandedness in distributing it."
Although Souter conceded that, in the 1980s, with Witters and Zobrest,
the Court moved toward the third definition of neutrality, he insisted
that evenhandedness has never provided a sufficient test of
constitutionality.
Hence, if we looked no further than evenhandedness, and failed to ask
what activities the aid might support, or in fact did support, religious
schools could be blessed with government funding as massive as
expenditures made for the benefit of their public school
counterparts,
156
and religious missions would thrive on public money.
The two concurring justices, O'Connor and Breyer, accepted many
aspects of Souter's dissent, but disputed his interpretation of the facts
about the use of school materials in Jefferson Parish. 157 The factual
disputes among plurality, concurrence and dissent over the outcome-to
fund or not-revolved around the question of the divertibility of aid to
religion.
B. Actual Diversion/Divertibility
The diversion question is
religious practice. Mitchell
diversion-no diversion, actual
plurality rejected any diversion

whether government funds subsidize
offers three different resolutions of
diversion, and divertibility. 158 First, the
test entirely because it is "unworkable"

151. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
152. Id. at 900 (Souter, J., dissenting).
153. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 878 (Souter, J., dissenting).
155. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 885 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Witters v. Wash. Dept. of Servs. for the Blind,
474 U.S. 481 (1986); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
157. Mitchell, U.S. at 853-57 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
158. Id. at 793 (plurality opinion).
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'
and "boundless." 159
"The issue is not divertibility of aid but rather
whether the aid itself has an impermissible content." 160 This content is
not the subject standard proposed in this essay, however, which looks to
the nature of the aid. The plurality's content is assessed by asking if the
16 1
same aid is given to nonreligious, areligious and religious groups.
How the aid is actually used in religious schools is ignored. For
example, chalk, crayons, pens, computers and paper are divertible (i.e.,
they may be used to teach religion) but they do not indoctrinate because
they do not have impermissible religious content and because they are
given to everyone. Oddly enough, the plurality's indifference to
diversion suggests that its content standard is empty, as the plurality
accepted that anything, even Shakespeare, can be diverted to religious
instruction. 162 Nonetheless, such actual diversion to religious
indoctrination is no bar to government aid.
O'Connor contested the plurality's argument that "actual diversion"
to religious mission is permissible. 163 Establishment Clause precedent,
including Agostini and Allen, prohibits the actual diversion of
government funds to support religion. 164 "Although '[o]ur cases have
permitted some government funding of secular functions performed by
sectarian organizations,' our decisions 'provide no precedent for the use
of public funds to finance religious activities.' 165 On the facts,
O'Connor found insufficient actual diversion of government funds to
religious mission for a constitutional violation. 166 Diversion did occur.
For example, 191 religious books were purchased at the religious
schools' request. 167 When public officials later noticed the violation,
the books were recalled. 168 Justice O'Connor noted, however, that this

159. Id. at 820, 824 (plurality opinion).
160. Id. at 822 (plurality opinion).
So long as the governmental aid is not itself unsuitable for use in the public schools
because of religious content, and eligibility for aid is determined in a constitutionally
permissible manner, any use of that aid to indoctrinate cannot be attributed to the
government and is thus not of constitutional concern. And, of course, the use to which
the aid is put does not affect the criteria governing the aid's allocation and thus does
not create any impermissible incentive under Agostini's second criterion.
Id. at 820 (plurality opinion) (citation omitted).
161. Id. at 809 (plurality opinion).
162. Id. at 823-24 (plurality opinion).
163. Id. at 840 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
164. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
165. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va.,
515 U.S. 819, 847 (1995)).
166. Id. at 861-67 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
167. Id. at 866 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
168. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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was less than one percent of the total allocation of books. 169 There was
also persuasive evidence that government projectors were used more
regularly in theology classes than in science classes.' 70 O'Connor
concluded that this too
was de minimis, insufficient to create a
17 1
constitutional violation.
This aid is constitutional even though the oversight mechanisms in
Jefferson Parish were apparently poor. 172 There was no systematic
record-keeping or labeling. Religious schools requested the materials
they wanted and agreed to comply with the government standards.
Inspections were usually announced in advance and occurred only once
a year. The inspections depended upon the word of the private schools
and not on thorough investigation by public officials. The books, for
example, were reviewed by title. One of the 191 books recalled as a
religious book was The Saints Go Marching In-about the New Orleans
Saints football team. 173 Nonetheless, the Constitution, according to
Justice O'Connor, does not require fail-safe mechanisms. Any actual
diversion was "minuscule" and so not unconstitutional. 174 De minimis
and minuscule are vague constitutional standards with questionable
Establishment Clause application. In Lee v. Weisman, for example, the
Court rejected the argument that a "brief' graduation ceremony prayer
75
was de minimis and so constitutional.1

169. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
170. See id. at 864 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
171. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). But see Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 594 (1992). The
graduation prayer was,
we concede, a brief exercise during which the individual can concentrate on joining its
message, meditate on her own religion, or let her mind wander. But the embarrassment
and the intrusion of the religious exercise cannot be refuted by arguing that these
prayers, and similar ones to be said in the future, are of a de minimis character.
Id.
172. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 832-34 (plurality opinion).
173. Brief for Respondents at 42, Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (No. 98-1648).
174. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 865 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that, "[there is] no case in
which [the Court has] declared an entire aid program unconstitutional on Establishment Clause
grounds solely because of violations on the minuscule scale of those at issue here").
175. Lee, 505 U.S. at 594.
But the embarrassment and the intrusion of the religious exercise cannot be refuted by
arguing that these prayers, and similar ones to be said in the future, are of a de minimis
character. To do so would be an affront to the rabbi who offered them and to all those
for whom the prayers were an essential and profound recognition of divine authority.
And for the same reason, we think that the intrusion is greater than the two minutes or
so of time consumed for prayers like these. Assuming, as we must, that the prayers
were offensive to the student and the parent who now object, the intrusion was both
real and, in the context of a secondary school, a violation of the objectors' rights.
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The actual diversion in Jefferson Parish was an Establishment Clause
violation to the dissent. 176 "[W]e have long held government aid invalid
when circumstances would allow its diversion to religious
education."' 77 Given the difficulties of monitoring, and the inadequacy
of the oversight in Jefferson Parish, possible diversion (divertibility) of
aid is also unconstitutional.
The divertibility standard is consistent with Souter's no-aid-toreligion principle. Because the risk of diversion is highest in financial
aid cases, the Court has not allowed direct monetary aid to private
schools. 178 The Court permitted loans of textbooks but not projectors
and other equipment because "[w]hile the textbooks had a known and
fixed secular content not readily divertible to religious teaching
purposes, the adaptable materials did not." 179 The Establishment Clause
prohibits divertibility.
O'Connor and Souter disagreed about the facts. For him, all actual
diversion is unconstitutional; 180 for her, this actual diversion was de
minimis. 18' They also disagree about the law: divertibility v. actual
diversion. Her opposition to divertibility is its presumption that
religious schools will indoctrinate. As in Agostini, in Mitchell she
opposed a presumption of bad faith by religious schools. 8 2 Yet she did
and
not impose a constitutional requirement of government monitoring
83
1
standard.
diversion
actual
the
of
violation
some
she accepted
C. Pervasively Sectarian
In Mitchell, the trial court concluded that the Catholic schools were
pervasively sectarian and so not entitled to aid under Supreme Court
precedent. 184 The plurality denounced this "offensive" test, with its
"shameful pedigree," and concluded that "[t]his doctrine, born of
bigotry, should be buried now." 185 What bigotry? "'Sectarian' was

176. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 903-10 (Souter, J., dissenting).
177. Id. at 890 (Souter, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 890-93 (Souter, J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 893-94 (Souter, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 908-10 (Souter, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 864 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
182. Id. at 863-64 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
183. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
184. Id. at 904-05 n.23 (Souter, J., dissenting). For a discussion of pervasively sectarian, see
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) and
Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
185. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 829 (plurality opinion).
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code for Catholic." 186 The renunciation of the "pervasively sectarian"
test is consistent with evenhandedness neutrality: Catholic and public
schools should receive the same aid.
Justice Souter has never abandoned the premise of the institutional
principle, which holds that everything in the religious schools is
religious. "Pervasively sectarian" are Catholic and other religious
schools in which "the overriding religious mission.. . is not confined to
a discrete element of the curriculum."' 187 In pervasively sectarian
schools, one cannot distinguish secular teaching from religion.
Pervasively sectarian "is simply a matter of common sense: where
religious indoctrination pervades school activities of children and
adolescents it takes great care to be able to aid the school without
supporting the doctrinal effort."' 188 No aid to religion means no aid to
religious mission. 189 Souter's dissent provides the starkest statement of
the institutional principle in First Amendment jurisprudence: "In fact,
religious education in Roman Catholic schools is defined as part of
required religious practice; aiding it is thus akin to aiding a church
service." 190 A religious school is a church. Aid to such schools
19 1
"inevitably and impermissibly support[s] religious indoctrination."'
The dissent established that the Jefferson Parish Catholic schools
were pervasively sectarian by reference to the Code of Canon Law and
192
to the schools' mission statements.
Based on record evidence and long experience, we have concluded
that religious teaching in such schools is at the core of the instructors'
individual and personal obligations, cf. Canon 803 § 2, Text &
Commentary 568 ("It is necessary that the formation and education
given in a Catholic school be based upon the principles of Catholic
doctrine; teachers are to be outstanding for their correct doctrine and
integrity of life"), and that individual religious teachers will teach
religiously. 193

186. Id. at 828 (plurality opinion) (stating, "it was an open secret that 'sectarian' was code for
'Catholic"').
187. Id. at 885 (Souter, J., dissenting).
188. Id. at 912 (Souter, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 913 (Souter, J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 886 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947);
John Courtney Murray, Law or Prepossessions?,14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 23 (1949).
191. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 887 (Souter, J., dissenting).
192. Id. at 886 n.6 (Souter, J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 886 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also id. at 886-87 n.7 (Souter, J., dissenting).
"Although the Court no longer assumes that public school teachers assigned to religious schools
for limited purposes will teach religiously, see Agostini v. Felton, we have never abandoned the
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Mission statements and Canon Law, however, do not tell us how
secular aid is used or how secular subjects are taught in religious
schools. "[Flormal normative teachings discussed under headings such
as 'Catholic medical ethics,' 'Jewish bioethics,' or 'Hindu bioethics'
often have little connection with the actual beliefs and practices 1of
94
millions of people who call themselves Catholic, Jewish, or Hindu."'
The legal test should not be whether the institution is pervasively
sectarian according to administrative or mission statements. The test is
what occurs within the institutions. Thus actual diversion to religious
practice is unconstitutional, and divertibility requires government
monitoring of actual use of equipment in the schools. Such monitoring
does not violate the Establishment Clause by creating an "excessive
195
entanglement" between church and state.
IV. CONCLUSION

The institutional principle and the speaker standard avoid the
constitutional question whether government aid supports religious
practice.
Since 1947, the justices have used the institutional
presumption and the government/private speech distinction in support
of their own theological prepossessions instead of assessing the conduct
of the public and the private schools.
The First Amendment requires a distinction between the secular and
the sectarian. If the government cannot distinguish between the secular
and the religious, then it has no basis upon which to build a public
school system or other government institutions.
The Establishment Clause forbids the government to support religion.
Since 1947, the Court has struggled to draw the line between church and
presumption that religious teachers will teach just that way." Id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
194. Ronald M. Green, Religions' 'Bioethical Sensibility': A Research Agenda, in NOTES
FROM A NARROW RIDGE: RELIGION AND BIOETHICS 165, 166 (Dena S. Davis & Laurie Zoloth
eds., 1999).
195. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234 (1997).
Since we have abandoned the assumption that properly instructed public employees
will fail to discharge their duties faithfully, we must also discard the assumption that
pervasive monitoring of Title I teachers is required. There is no suggestion in the
record before us that unannounced monthly visits of public supervisors are insufficient
to prevent or to detect inculcation of religion by public employees. Moreover, we have
not found excessive entanglement in cases in which States imposed far more onerous
burdens on religious institutions than the monitoring system at issue here.
Id.; Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 615-17 (1988) (permitting government monitoring of
religious adolescent counseling programs); Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 764-65
(1976) (allowing state audits to ensure that grants to religious colleges are not used to teach
religion).

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 33

state, religious and secular. In the schools cases, the institutional
spectrum has been inadequate because it denied support to secular
activity in religious schools while permitting religious practice in the
public schools. 196 The Establishment Clause prohibits government
support of religious practice wherever it occurs, and allows the
provision of public welfare to all citizens, religious, irreligious and
areligious.
The speaker spectrum has been no more satisfactory. It offers no
protection to the speech of private school students. It does shelter the
practice of religion in public institutions and with public funding. The
Court's casuistry of private and government speech should not obscure
the practical reality: that the speech standard permits governmentsupported religious practice by the majority religion. Although
Christian students lost in Santa Fe, only Christians have been victorious
197
in the Court's mixed Free Speech and Establishment Clause cases.
Under the subject test, the result in Santa Fe is correct. The
Establishment Clause bars government support or funding of religious
practices. The world's religions have many dimensions, one of which is
the ritual or practical dimension. 198 Prayer is a quintessential religious
196. Compare Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (permitting religious activity in a
state school), with Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) (denying the use of state funds to pay
parochial school employees), overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
197. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 202 F.3d 502 (2d Cir. 2000), rev'd, 121 S.
Ct. 2093 (2001) (upholding Christian Bible study group's use of school facilities); Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 826 (1995) (requiring the University of Virginia
to fund the magazine "Wide Awake: A Christian Perspective at the University of Virginia,"
which has "a two-fold mission: 'to challenge Christians to live, in word and deed, according to
the faith they proclaim and to encourage students to consider what a personal relationship with
Jesus Christ means"'); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 38789 (1993) (requiring school district to give school access to "an evangelical church" in order to
display a film series advocating "returning to traditional, Christian family values," a "[flamily
oriented movie-from a Christian perspective." In Film 5, "Mrs. Dobson recalls the influences
which brought her to a loving God who saw her personal circumstances and heard her cries for
help."); Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 232 (1990) (requiring
school district, on statutory grounds, without reaching the free speech question, to provide access
to a "Christian club ... to read and discuss the Bible, to have fellowship, and to pray together");
Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267 (requiring university to permit access to student group Cornerstone, and
invalidating a university regulation prohibiting use of facilities for "religious worship and
religious teaching"); id. at 265 n.2 (describing Cornerstone as "an organization of evangelical
Christian students from various denominational backgrounds.... A typical Cornerstone meeting
included prayer, hymns, Bible commentary, and discussion of religious views and experiences").
But see Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (holding Jewish rabbi not permitted to offer
nonsectarian prayer at graduation ceremony).
198. NINIAN SMART, THE WORLD'S RELIGIONS 10-22 (1989). These dimensions include the
ethical and legal dimension (which guide the conduct of a religion's adherents, principles and
precepts about how to live); the social and institutionaldimension (what kinds of group structures
religious people inhabit); the narrative or mythic dimension (religious traditions possess
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practice, 199 and practiced religion is particular. Although dictionaries
offer general definitions of prayer, 20 0 the content of prayer is
determined by the specific beliefs of particular religions, whether
Christianity, Islam, Shinto, Hinduism, Judaism, Sikhism, or
Zoroastrianism. 20 1 Prayer is particular.
What about common prayer, or the prayer of civil religion? 20 2 There
is reason to be skeptical about the concept. Even at the intellectual,
academic or philosophical level, it is difficult to find a common
descriptive or analytical account of all the world's religions. Despite
great strides in ecumenism in the twentieth century, there is no unity of
the world's religions on questions of faith and belief. A common
intellectual or ecumenical account of religion has not developed; a
common religious ritual is even less likely to emerge. 20 3 Indeed,
foundational stories of meaning that explain life and origins); the doctrinal or philosophical
dimension (which provides the intellectual explanation of a religion's belief system, the
intellectual statement of the basis of the faith) and the ritual or practical dimension. Id.
199. Lee, 505 U.S. at 587 (stating graduation prayer is an "overt religious exercise"); Marsh v.
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 797 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). "That the 'purpose' of legislative
prayer is pre-eminently religious rather than secular seems to me to be self-evident. 'To invoke
Divine guidance on a public body entrusted with making the laws,' .. . is nothing but a religious
act." Marsh, 463 U.S. at 797 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
200. One dictionary defines prayer as a "direct address to the godis], especially in the form of
" THE HARPER COLLINS DICTIONARY OF RELIGION 852 (Jonathan Z. Smith ed.,
petition ....
1995). Another defines prayer as "the relating of soul or self to God in trust, penitence, praise,
" THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF WORLD RELIGIONS 762 (John Bowker ed., 1997).
petition ....
201. THE HARPER COLLINS DICTIONARY OF RELIGION, supra note 200, at 852-54.
202. See generally Lee, 505 U.S. at 589.
We are asked to recognize the existence of a practice of nonsectarian prayer, prayer
within the embrace of what is known as the Judeo-Christian tradition, prayer which is
more acceptable than one which, for example, makes explicit references to the God of
Israel, or to Jesus Christ, or to a patron saint. There may be some support, as an
empirical observation, to the statement of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit...
that there has emerged in this country a civic religion, one which is tolerated when
sectarian exercises are not. If common ground can be defined which permits once
conflicting faiths to express the shared conviction that there is an ethic and a morality
which transcend human invention, the sense of community and purpose sought by all
decent societies might be advanced. But though the First Amendment does not allow
the government to stifle prayers which aspire to these ends, neither does it permit the
government to undertake that task for itself.
Id. (citations omitted).
203. The Court has made some observations acknowledging civic recognition of religion. Id.
at 589; Marsh, 463 U.S. at 783. In Lee the Court stated: "There may be some support, as an
empirical observation, to the statement of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ...that there
has emerged in this country a civic religion, one which is tolerated when sectarian exercises are
not [citations omitted]." Lee, 505 U.S. at 589. Further, in Marsh the Court recognized "the
delegates did not consider opening prayers as a proselytizing activity or as symbolically placing
the government's 'official seal of approval on one religious view,' [citation omitted]. Rather, the
Founding Fathers looked at invocations as 'conduct whose ...effect ...harmonize[d] with the
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Americans are moving from institution-centered to more individual
forms of spirituality. 204 As Justice Kennedy explained in the graduation
prayer case: "The suggestion that government may establish an official
or civil religion as a means of avoiding the establishment of a religion
with more specific creeds strikes us as a contradiction that cannot be
20 5
accepted."
With more diversity of religious ritual, without a common prayer for
adherents of all religions, the default public religion may well become
the religion of the majority, "the faith with the most votes" 2 6 -as the
case law demonstrates. 20 7 The Establishment Clause does not permit a
20 8
default religion in public institutions.
Prayer is a benchmark for Establishment Clause cases, an activity
against which other practices should be judged.20 9
Current
tenets of some or all religions."' Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792 (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420, 442 (1961)).
204. See generally ROBERT WUTHNOW, AFTER HEAVEN 169 (1999) (discussing complex
social realities that influence American spirituality).
205. Lee, 505 U.S. at 590.
206. See id. at 617-18 (Souter, J., concurring).
Nor does it solve the problem to say that the State should promote a "diversity" of
religious views; that position would necessarily compel the government and,
inevitably, the courts to make wholly inappropriate judgments about the number of
religions the State should sponsor and the relative frequency with which it should
sponsor each. In fact, the prospect would be even worse than that. As Madison
observed in criticizing religious Presidential proclamations, the practice of sponsoring
religious messages tends, over time, "to narrow the recommendation to the standard of
the predominant sect." We have not changed much since the days of Madison, and the
judiciary should not willingly enter the political arena to battle the centripetal force
leading from religious pluralism to official preference for the faith with the most votes.
Id. (Souter, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
207. See supra note 197 and accompanying text (discussing Christian victories in
Establishment Clause cases).
208. See generally Lee, 505 U.S. at 616-17 (Souter, J., concurring).
In many contexts, including this one, nonpreferentialism requires some distinction
between "sectarian" religious practices and those that would be, by some measure,
ecumenical enough to pass Establishment Clause muster. Simply by requiring the
enquiry, nonpreferentialists invite the courts to engage in comparative theology. I can
hardly imagine a subject less amenable to the competence of the federal judiciary, or
more deliberately to be avoided where possible.
Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
209. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 284 (1981) (White, J., dissenting). The argument
accepted by the majority, is founded on the proposition that because religious worship
uses speech, it is protected by the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. Not
only is it protected, they argue, but religious worship qua speech is not different from
any other variety of protected speech as a matter of constitutional principle. I believe
that this proposition is plainly wrong. Were it right, the Religion Clauses would be
emptied of any independent meaning in circumstances in which religious practice took
the form of speech.
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Establishment Clause case law would require revision if activities in
public schools were judged by their similarity to prayer and ritual.
Under the speaker standard, the Court has permitted funding of "Wide
Awake: A Christian Perspective at the University of Virginia," which
has "a two-fold mission: 'to challenge Christians to live, in word and
deed, according to the faith they proclaim and to encourage students to
consider what a personal relationship with Jesus Christ means."' 2 10 It
has required a school district to give access to "an evangelical church"
for display of a film series advocating "returning to traditional,
Christian family values." 21 1 In another school district, the Court
mandated equal access for a "Christian club ... to read and discuss the
Bible, to have fellowship, and to pray together." 2 12 The University of
Missouri was not allowed to deny Cornerstone, "an organization of
evangelical Christian students from various denominational
backgrounds," 213 the use of school facilities for religious worship, even
though, "[a] typical Cornerstone meeting included prayer, hymns, Bible
' 2 14
commentary, and discussion of religious views and experiences. "
None of these religious practices should survive constitutional scrutiny.
The "speech" that the Court protects in these cases is really the practice
2 15
of religion.
In the Missouri case, dissenting Justice White argued for a distinction
between "verbal acts of worship and other verbal acts." 216 Although he
agree[d] that the line may be difficult to draw in many cases, surely
the majority cannot seriously suggest that no line may ever be drawn.
If that were the case, the majority would have to uphold the
University's right to offer a class entitled "Sunday Mass." Under the
majority's view, such a class would be-as a matter of constitutional
principle-indistinguishable from a class entitled "The History of the
Catholic Church." 217
The cases ignore the religious reality that in some religious traditions
(especially evangelical Christianity) speech, i.e., preaching the Gospel,

Id. (White, J.,
dissenting).
210. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 826 (1995).
211. Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 387-88 (1993).
212. Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 232 (1990).
213. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 265 n.2.
214. Id.
215. See Mark Tushnet, The Redundant Free Exercise Clause, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 71, 75
n.21 (2001) (expressing concern about assimilating prayer to speech).
216. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 285 (White, J., dissenting).
217. Id. at 285-86 (White, J. dissenting).
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is a quintessential religious practice. Like Sunday Mass, it should not
have government sponsorship.
A bus ride, a biology textbook, remedial mathematics classes, even
The Saints Go Marching In, are different. Religious practices also
provide the benchmark for aid -to religious schools. Aid should be
assessed by analogy to religious practice and public welfare.
"Government provision of such paradigms of universally general
welfare benefits as police and fire protection does not count as aid to
2 18
religion."
Three members of the Mitchell plurality dissented in Santa Fe;2 19 it is
not surprising that they permitted unlimited aid to pervasively sectarian
schools in Mitchell. "[T]he plurality's notion of evenhandedness
neutrality ... would be the end of the principle of no aid to the schools'
religious mission." 220 The plurality has no spectrum.
Because of the constitutional distinction between public welfare and
religious practice, the actual diversion of aid to religious practice is
unconstitutional. Divertible aid also poses the risk of constitutional
violations. Accordingly, divertible aid may be given to religious
institutions if its divertibility is monitored by the government. The
divertibility assessment should focus on the use of the aid, however, and
not on the nature of the institution. Secular books are permitted, as the
Court has properly held since 1968.221 Computers, projectors and other
equipment must be monitored so that they are used for secular purposes.
Because of the difficulties of such monitoring, the government may be
wise to provide (and the churches to accept) Agostini-style aid, in which
public personnel bring their secular experience into the private schools.
It is a matter of free exercise for churches to accept or reject the strings
attached.

218. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 877 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
Whether a law's benefit is sufficiently close to universally general welfare paradigms
to be classified with them, as distinct from religious aid, is a function of the purpose
and effect of the challenged law in all its particularity. The judgment is not reducible
to the application of any formula. Evenhandedness of distribution as between religious
and secular beneficiaries is a relevant factor, but not a sufficiency test of
constitutionality. There is no rule of religious equal protection to the effect that any
expenditure for the benefit of religious school students is necessarily constitutional so
long as public school pupils are favored on ostensibly identical terms.
Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
219. See also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 631 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., White, Scalia &
Thomas, JJ., dissenting) (rejecting the "holding that the Establishment Clause prohibits
invocations and benedictions at public school graduation ceremonies").
220. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 911 (Souter, J., dissenting).
221. Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
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The Establishment Clause serves three ends: "to guarantee the right
of individual conscience against compulsion, to protect the integrity of
religion against the corrosion of secular support, and to preserve the
unity of political society against the implied exclusion of the less
favored and the antagonism of controversy over public support for
religious causes." 222 A subject standard can protect these ends.
On public support, citizens should not be required to provide their tax
dollars for the benefit of religious practices, whether in public or private
institutions. 223 Religious practices are particular. The ideal of a
common prayer or a common theology is illusory, and the government
may not establish a civil religion. 224 It is not hostile to religion to
conclude that religion can be divisive. Religions are not shared by all
citizens; the Establishment Clause bars government and tax support of
them, which inevitably leads to controversy. Tax dollars, however, are
regularly spent on the public welfare, for which religious groups may
qualify.
The Court has identified a second Establishment Clause concern: that
225
religion(s) may be corrupted if they accept support from the state.
The courts may not be arbiters of corrupt religion, however. Nor may
the states deny desired public welfare aid because they believe that
churches will be corrupted by it. Religious groups may accept
government aid as a matter of free exercise. Religions divide over their
interpretation of the corruption of this world. Not every Christian is
222. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 868 (Souter, J., dissenting).
223. Id. at 872 (Souter, J., dissenting).
224. Lee, 505 U.S. at 590. "The suggestion that government may establish an official or civic
religion as a means of avoiding the establishment of a religion with more specific creeds strikes
us as a contradiction that cannot be accepted." Id.
225. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 243 (1997) (Souter, J. dissenting). The flat ban on
subsidies to religion
expresses the hard lesson learned over and over again in the American past and in the
experiences of the countries from which we have come, that religions supported by
governments are compromised just as surely as the religious freedom of dissenters is
burdened when the government supports religion. "When the government favors a
particular religion or sect, the disadvantage to all others is obvious, but even favored
religion may fear being 'taint[ed] ...with corrosive secularism.' The favored religion
may be compromised as political figures reshape the religion's beliefs for their own
purposes; it may be reformed as government largesse brings government regulation."
Id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 608 (1992) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (citation omitted)); see also Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious
Assessments 1785, in THE COMPLETE MADISON 299, 309 (S. Padover ed., 1953) ("Religion
flourishes in greater purity, without than with the aid of Gov[ernment]"); M. HOWE, THE
GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 6 (1965) (noting Roger Williams' view that "worldly
corruptions... might consume the churches if sturdy fences against the wilderness were not
maintained").
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Roger Williams. 2 26 Free exercise protects these internal theological
disputes, and courts have no jurisdiction to resolve them.22 7 The subject
standard permits the church to accept secular aid according to its own
vision of corruption, and leaves to state and court the definition and
enforcement of secularity and public welfare. The government may
appropriately monitor its aid without creating an "excessive
228
entanglement" between church and state.
Finally, both Establishment and Free Exercise protect "the right of
individual conscience against compulsion." 229 The First Amendment
warns of the power of both government and organized religion. When
spiritual and temporal institutions join forces, they may circumscribe
the freedom of the individual. Madison's and Jefferson's "radical
solution to the religion problem was to recognize that every individual
retains a sovereign right to accept or reject the claims of religion,
230
entirely free of the coercive authority of the state or community."
Majority religious practice in public institutions-prayer and worship
in the public schools-threatens "the right of individual conscience
against compulsion." 23' The unlimited aid of religious practice in
pervasively sectarian institutions, allotted on a per capita basis, is more
likely to protect the decisions of school administrators than the rights of
individual conscience. With their prospect of more student prayer and
more aid to religious practice, Santa Fe and Mitchell have given us
more prepossessions instead of a constitutional standard that protects
core First Amendment values.

226. See HOWE, supra note 225, at 6-9.
227. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944).
228. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234; Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 615-17 (1988); Roemer v.
Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 764-65 (1976) (allowing state audits to ensure that grants to
religious colleges are not used to teach religion).
229. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 868 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
230. Jack Rakove, A Nation Still Learning What Madison Knew, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2001,
at D15.
231. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 868 (Souter, J., dissenting).

